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INTRODUCTION
At what point does retroactive tax legislation become intoler-
able' and transgress constitutional limitations? Over the years,
appellate courts have employed differing formulations of the crite-
ria used to determine when a retroactive tax measure has gone too
far. Although a bright-line test has yet to definitively emerge, tax
measures with retroactivity periods of one year or less consistently
have been upheld. Conversely, a number of tax measures contain-
ing periods of retroactivity greater than one year have been in-
validated under the Due Process Clause.
In the seminal 1994 Supreme Court decision United States v.
Carlton,2 the Court held that an amendment intended to retroac-
tively close a loophole in recently enacted federal estate tax legis-
lation was constitutional. 3 Like much of the retroactive federal
tax legislation that has survived constitutional scrutiny, the pe-
riod of retroactivity was relatively modest (approximately one year
in length).4 The majority opinion declined to articulate a bright-
line standard or set forth concrete, objective criteria to use in
evaluating due process challenges to retroactive tax measures.
Many commentators therefore reasonably believed that Carlton
served as the death knell for due process limitation on retroactive
tax legislation. 5 In a concurring opinion in Carlton, however, Jus-
1. Judge Learned Hand framed the issue in this manner in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of a retroactive income tax measure. Cohan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 39
F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930).
2. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
3. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32.
4. Id. at 27.
5. See, e.g., Ronald Z. Domsky, Retroactive Taxation: United States v. Carlton-The
Taxpayer Loses Again!, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 77 (1995); Faith Colson, Constitutional Law
Due Process-The Supreme Court Sounds the Death Knell for Due Process Challenges to
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tice O'Connor observed that the governmental interest in revising
tax laws must at some point give way to the "taxpayer's interest in
finality and repose," and that a "period of retroactivity longer than
the year preceding the legislative session in which the law was
enacted would raise ... serious constitutional questions."6 Since
Carlton was decided, several state courts have relied on Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion to invalidate retroactive state and
local tax measures under the Due Process Clause.7 In each of
these decisions, the period of retroactivity exceeded two years.8
These state court decisions indicate that due process limitation on
retroactive tax legislation is alive and well. The question remains:
where and how to draw the line?
Consistent with Justice O'Connor's analysis, this article pro-
poses that a presumptive line be drawn at the year preceding the
legislative session in which the subject tax law is enacted. This
outcome would preserve the ability of legislative bodies to
promptly remedy perceived loopholes and errors in recently en-
acted legislation without a concomitant loss in revenue. At the
federal level, it would also account for practical issues associated
with the development and enactment of tax legislation. This pre-
sumption would ensure some reasonable level of finality for tax-
payers and further prohibit legislation that unduly restricts tax-
payer rights and remedies.
Such a one-year presumption should be rebuttable, however.
For instance, under established precedent, the Due Process Clause
prohibits the retroactive imposition of "wholly new taxes," regard-
less of the length of the look-back period.9 On the other hand, tax
jurisdictions should retain the ability to surmount the presump-
tion when they can demonstrate compelling circumstances for the
period of retroactivity, such as an inability to have acted sooner.
Part I of this article describes the various constitutional chal-
lenges that have been launched against retroactive tax measures.
In general, only substantive due process challenges have met with
any level of success. In Part II, the article traces the history of
twentieth-century due process challenges to retroactive tax meas-
ures, culminating in the landmark Carlton decision. Although the
Retroactive Tax Legislation, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 243 (1995); Laura Ricciardi, The Aftermath of
United States v. Carlton: Taxpayers Will Have to Pay for Congress's Mistakes, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 599 (1996).
6. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7. See infra Part III(C).
8. Id.
9. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34.
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formulation of the due process test evolved, Carlton clarified that
to pass constitutional muster, a retroactive tax must (1) be levied
for a legitimate, legislative purpose and (2) possess a modest pe-
riod of retroactivity ("modesty doctrine"). 10 Part III of the article
discusses the post-Carlton landscape. Several state courts have
invalidated state and local tax measures with retroactivity periods
greater than a year, while federal courts generally have upheld
federal tax measures, most of which possessed retroactivity peri-
ods of less than a year. In Part IV, the article contends that tax
legislation containing retroactivity periods greater than one year
in length should be presumptively invalid under Carlton's mod-
esty doctrine. Lastly, Part V of the article applies this test to Cali-
fornia's 2004 tax amnesty legislation and concludes that the retro-
active penalty provisions in the legislation are unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO RETROACTIVE TAx
LEGISLATION
The United States Constitution neither expressly authorizes nor
prohibits retroactive tax legislation.11 In general, a retroactive
statute is one that 'takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or
considerations already past."' 12 Retroactive tax measures have
run the gamut from wholly new taxes, increased tax rates, broad-
ened tax bases, elimination of deductions and exemptions, restric-
tion of taxpayer remedies, and enhanced penalties-all applied to
prior transactions or conduct.13
Although the Constitution does not expressly prohibit retroac-
tive tax measures, taxpayers have mounted a variety of legal chal-
10. Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. Several state constitutions prohibit retroactive legislation, however. See, e.g., TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 16 (prohibits retroactive legislation); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11 (prohibits
retrospective legislation).
12. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994) (quoting Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.N.H. 1814)).
13. For examples of these types of retroactive taxation, see parts II-III, infra. In inter-
preting a statute to determine whether the legislature intended it to operate retroactively,
there is a presumption against retroactivity. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. The presumption
against retroactive legislation exists because retroactive legislation typically deprives citi-
zens of legitimate expectations and upsets settled transactions. General Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992). Nonetheless, a statute will be interpreted to apply ret-
roactively if the text of the statute unambiguously expresses the legislature's intent for it to
apply retroactively. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73.
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lenges to such legislation since the eighteenth century. As dis-
cussed below, most of these efforts have failed. Taxpayers have
met with little success in contending that retroactive taxation vio-
lates the Ex Post Facto, Contract, Equal Protection, and Takings
Clauses of the Constitution. However, taxpayers have enjoyed
modest success in asserting that retroactive tax statutes violate
the Due Process Clause.
A. The Ex Post Facto Clause
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution prohibits Congress
from passing any "bill of attainder or ex post facto law."14 The
Constitution also provides "that no state shall pass any ex post
facto law."'15 In 1798-with refreshing candor-Justice Chase ob-
served in Calder v. Bull16 that this constitutional language "neces-
sarily requires some explanation; for naked and without explana-
tion, it is unintelligible, and means nothing."'17 The opinion pro-
ceeded to explain that an ex post facto law is one that "shall not be
passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing done, or action
committed."' 8  On its face, the Ex Post Facto Clause therefore
would seem to prohibit any tax statute that retroactively changes
the legal or financial consequences of a prior transaction or activ-
ity.
In Calder, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the
clause does not apply to civil statutes.' 9 Relying on English com-
mon law, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause was in-
tended to protect individuals from punishment imposed by such
laws, and it therefore determined that the clause prohibited only
retrospective criminal punishment. 20 Accordingly, the use of the
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
16. 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
17. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 389-90. Notably, in a prophetic passage, the Court observed:
Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws, is
retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good general
rule, that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may
justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time




Ex Post Facto clause as a constitutional restriction on retroactive
tax legislation was rejected in the earliest days of the Republic.
21
B. The Contract Clause
Contract Clause challenges to retroactive tax legislation like-
wise have fared with scant success. The Contract Clause prohibits
states from passing any law "impairing the [o]bligation of
[c]ontracts." 22  State constitutions often contain similar provi-
sions.23 In Contract Clause challenges to retroactive tax legisla-
tion, taxpayers have contended that existing legislation has cre-
ated a contract between the state and its taxpayers,24 or alterna-
tively, that the retroactive application of a tax statute has im-
paired existing contracts with third parties. 25 In retroactively
amending the legislation to the taxpayer's detriment, the state
impairs the contract it created with its citizens or that existed be-
tween private parties.
Aside from the Lochner era, 26 when strict scrutiny was applied
to economic measures, these Contract Clause challenges to retro-
active tax legislation consistently failed because courts reject the
notion that the prior law created a contract between the taxpayer
and the state or that the retroactive application of tax legislation
impaired existing contracts.27 Absent a clear indication that the
legislature intended to bind itself contractually, the presumption
is that 'a law is not intended to create private contractual or
vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the
legislature shall ordain otherwise." '28 Moreover, even if a taxpayer
can demonstrate the legislature's intent to create private contrac-
tual and vested rights, to prove a violation of the Contract Clause,
the taxpayer further must show that the amendment substan-
21. However, the Ex Post Facto Clause may be invoked to protect individuals from
retroactive tax measures that impose criminal liability or punishment on past transactions.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
23. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. I, § 25.
24. See, e.g., Baker v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 105 P.3d 1180, 1183-84 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005).
25. See, e.g., Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 605 (1931).
26. See infra Part II(A).
27. Baker, 105 P.3d at 1183-84; cf. Coolidge, 282 U.S. at 605 (concluding that retroac-
tive application of an estate tax impaired a trust deed and therefore violated the Contract
Clause).
28. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 465-
66 (1985) (quoting Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)).
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tially impaired the taxpayer's rights and was not supported by a
significant and legitimate public purpose.
29
C. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause precludes a state from denying "to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.''30 Its use to invalidate retroactive taxation was severely
curtailed by a Supreme Court decision in 1938. In Welch v.
Henry,31 the taxpayer contended that a 1935 act of the Wisconsin
State Legislature imposing a tax on corporate dividends received
by the taxpayer in 1933, at rates and with deductions different
from those applicable in that year to other types of income, vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.
32
The 1933 legislation provided that dividends received from cor-
porations whose principal business was attributable to Wisconsin
were deductible from gross income. 33 By taking advantage of this
deduction, the taxpayer reported no taxable net income for tax
year 1933 when he filed his income tax return in 1934. 34 In an
emergency tax measure enacted in 1935, the legislature elimi-
nated all but $750 of deductions on such dividends, with the de-
duction amendment retroactive to the 1933 and 1934 tax years.
3 5
The taxpayer asserted that the legislature's retroactive amend-
ment, singling out a class of dividends for treatment different from
other forms of income, violated his right to equal protection. 36
Applying the rational basis test, the Court rejected the tax-
payer's argument that the legislation violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The Court held that the amended tax law was not a
denial of equal protection simply because it was retroactive and
that it "has never been thought that such changes involve a denial
of equal protection if the new taxes could have been included in
the earlier act when adopted."37 In leaving the equal protection
door only slightly ajar, the Court observed that a taxing statute
29. Baker, 105 P.3d at 1185; see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
32. Welch, 305 U.S. at 141.
33. The Court did not decide whether such a deduction violated the Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
34. Welch, 305 U.S. at 141.
35. Id. at 141-42.
36. Id. at 142.
37. Id. at 144-45.
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does not deny equal protection unless it amounts to "hostile or op-
pressive discrimination" against the taxpayer. 38  To date, no
United States Supreme Court decision has upheld an equal pro-
tection challenge to a retroactive tax statute.
3 9
D. The Takings Clause
Taxpayers have mounted several challenges to retroactive tax
measures under the Takings Clause. 40 This clause prohibits the
taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion.41 With one exception, courts consistently have held that
Congress's general exercise of its taxing power does not violate the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition on takings without just compensa-
tion.42 The levying of taxes does not constitute an unconstitu-
tional taking unless the taxation is so "arbitrary as to constrain
the conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation, but a con-
fiscation of property. 43
Based on this stringent standard, taxpayer challenges to retro-
active federal tax legislation under the Takings Clause generally
have been defeated on the basis that Congress routinely enacts
tax legislation with short and limited periods of retroactivity as a
practical necessity.44 Similarly, a takings challenge to a state's
retroactive reduction in the amount of tax refunds failed on the
theory that taxpayers did not have a vested right to the amount of
the tax refund.
45
38. Id. at 146.
39. Similarly, lower federal and state courts generally have rejected taxpayers' equal
protection challenges against retroactive tax legislation. See, e.g., Licari v. Comm'r of
Revenue, 946 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1991) (legislative classification supported by rational
basis); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Rudolph, No. 2004-CA-001566-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS
132 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), review granted by Rudolph v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No.2006-SC-
0416-DG, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 195 (Ky. Oct. 24, 2007) and Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Burnside,
No. 2007-SC-0819-DG, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 276 (Ky., Dec. 12, 2007).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. Id.
42. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916); Coleman v. Com-
missioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986); Rivers v. State, 490 S.E.2d 261, 263 (S.C. 1997).
However, in Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 532 (1927), applying the Brushaber test, the
Court held that the retroactive application of an amendment to the estate tax amounted to
confiscation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. No Supreme Court deci-
sion since Nichols has held that a retroactive tax measure violates the Takings Clause.
43. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24; Quarty v. U.S., 170 F.3d 961, 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
44. Quarty, 170 F.3d at 970; Kane v. U.S., 942 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. PA 1996).




II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE THROUGH UNITED STATES V.
CARLTON
In contrast to other constitutional challenges to retroactive
taxation, due process challenges have met with mixed success in
the federal and state courts. The Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of the law."46 While this amend-
ment applies only to federal action, the Fourteenth Amendment
applies due process protection to state action.
Due process challenges largely succeeded in the Lochner47 era of
exacting review of economic legislation. In the 1930s, the post-
Lochner era Supreme Court generally rejected due process chal-
lenges to retroactive taxation. As will be seen, however, the vast
majority of the post-Lochner litigation challenged tax measures
with retroactivity periods of one year or less.
A. Successful Due Process Challenges During the Lochner Era
In the era of strict review of economic legislation, the Court ap-
plied an actual notice test to retroactive tax legislation. Through
three decisions issued in the 1920s, the Court invalidated retroac-
tive estate tax measures because the taxpayers did not have notice
of the changing tax laws at the time they made decisions pertain-
ing to their estates.
In Nichols v. Coolidge,48 a federal estate tax statute sought to
retroactively include as part of two married decedents' gross es-
tates the value of property that the wife had transferred to others
prior to passage of the federal statute.49 There was no evidence
that the decedent had transferred her property to others in con-
templation of death.50 In holding that the retroactive application
of this estate tax provision violated the taxpayer's due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court noted that
the "arbitrary, whimsical, and burdensome character of the chal-
lenged tax is plain enough."51 Although thin in analysis, the deci-
sion appears to rest on the notion that the estate tax was a new
46. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
47. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
48. 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
49. Id. at 532.
50. Id. at 540.
51. Id. at 542.
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tax and that its retroactive imposition to past conduct was arbi-
trary and capricious.
5 2
Two other cases similarly held that the retroactive nature of the
nation's first estate and gift tax statutes violated the Due Process
Clause.53 Both of these decisions involved the gift tax, which was
to apply retroactively to prior transactions. As this tax was a
"wholly new tax" imposed on transactions that were not taxable
when they occurred, the Supreme Court struck the tax under the
Due Process Clause.5 4 Although not overruled, the continuing vi-
tality of these decisions has been questioned in subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions.5 5 To the extent the Nichols line of cases
survive, they are limited to cases involving "wholly new taxes,"
rather than amendments to existing tax schemes that retroac-
tively impact prior transactions.
56
B. Unsuccessful Due Process Challenges
Following the Lochner era, the Supreme Court consistently up-
held retroactive federal tax legislation against due process chal-
lenges. In sustaining the legislation, the Court employed a variety
of criteria, or at minimum, different formulations of the same legal
standard. In the early 1930s, the Court rejected several taxpayer
challenges by simply holding that all retroactive taxation was not
unconstitutional. 57 Presumably, the Court applied some form of
the palpably arbitrary test from the Nichols line of cases. From
1938 until 1984, the Court employed a "harsh and oppressive"
standard in measuring the constitutionality of retroactive tax leg-
islation.58 Then, from 1984 to the 1994 Carlton decision, the Court
shifted to an analysis of whether there was a "legitimate purpose"
behind the retroactive tax legislation.59 Critically, all of the retro-
active tax cases that were before the Court during this 1930-1994
time period addressed federal tax legislation with a look-back pe-
riod of less than two years, and in almost all cases, less than one.60
52. Id.
53. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927); see also Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S.
440 (1928).
54. Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147; see also Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445.
55. See, e.g., Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31.
56. U.S. v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568 (1986).
57. See Cooper v. U.S., 280 U.S. 409, 411 (1930); U.S. v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501
(1937).
58. See, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
59. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
60. See, e.g., Welch, 305 U.S. 134; Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. 717.
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In most instances, the subject legislation sought to cure a defect or
close a loophole that existed in legislation enacted in the previous
legislative session.
1. Denial of Taxpayer Challenges Under the Palpably Arbi-
trary Test
The Court's movement away from the strict review of economic
legislation in the context of retroactive taxation is perhaps best
illustrated by a 1931 Court decision upholding the retroactive in-
crease in the estate tax rate to a gift made in contemplation of
death.61 In Milliken v. United States,62 the decedent gave his chil-
dren corporate stock in December 1916.63 When the donor died in
1920, the tax commissioner included the stock shares in the dece-
dent's estate as a gift made in contemplation of death.64 The tax
rate applied to the gift was the tax rate from the Revenue Act of
1918, which was higher than the rate in the comparable revenue
act from 1916.65 The issue, therefore, was whether the application
of the higher tax rate, retroactive from 1918 to December 1916,
violated the Due Process Clause.
In denying the petitioners' challenge, the Court first contrasted
the Nichols line of decisions because they involved gifts made and
vested before passage of the statute imposing the gift tax.66 In
those cases, the donors had no notice that the subject of the gift
would be subject to taxation at all. In contrast, the Court rea-
soned, the Milliken donor had notice that the gift made in contem-
plation of death would be subject to taxation, albeit at a lower
rate.67 The Court held that a tax is not necessarily arbitrary and
invalid because it is retroactively applied and determined that it
was not enough for the taxpayer to show that the gift was made
before passage of the statute.68 In sustaining the application of
the higher tax rate to the gift transaction, the Court also relied on
the underlying policy of the 1918 legislation to equalize taxation of
61. For similar decisions distinguishing the Nichols line of authority, see Cooper v.
U.S., 280 U.S. 409, 412 (1930) (upholding income tax measure made retroactive to preced-
ing calendar year); and U.S. v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501 (upholding 35-day period of ret-
roactivity to income tax on sale of silver bullion).
62. 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
63. Milliken, 283 U.S. at 18-19.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 20-22.
67. Id. at 24.
68. Milliken, 283 U.S. at 21-22.
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gifts made in contemplation of death with testamentary disposi-
tions. 69 That intent, the Court concluded, would be undercut if
gifts made in contemplation of death after the 1916 act were taxed
more favorably than transfers from the donor at death.7
0
2. The Harsh and Oppressive Test
In continuing its movement away from strict review of economic
legislation, the Court formulated a new test in Welch v. Henry in
1938.71 The taxpayer asserted that the Wisconsin statute denied
him due process of law because, in 1935, it imposed a tax on in-
come received in 1933.72 In upholding the tax against this due
process challenge, the Court first relied on Milliken's basic prem-
ise that a tax is not necessarily unconstitutional because it is ret-
roactive. 73 The Court next distinguished the Nichols line of gift-
tax cases on the basis that those decisions "rested on the ground
that the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have
been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular vol-
untary act which the statute later made the taxable event."74 Ef-
fectively incorporating an element of actual notice into the due
process test, the Court reasoned that in the gift-tax cases, the do-
nor may have refrained from making the gift had the donor an-
ticipated the tax.
75
The Welch Court then proceeded to subtly formulate a new test,
which would be applied by the Court for nearly 50 years, by stat-
ing that in "each case it is necessary to consider the nature of the
tax and the circumstances in which it is laid before it can be said
that its retroactive application is so 'harsh and oppressive' as to
transgress the constitutional limitation."76 Applying this rather
nebulous 'harsh and oppressive" test, the Court first analyzed the
nature of the tax at issue. Because the tax was an income tax, the
Court summarily assumed that a stockholder would not refuse to
receive corporate dividends even if the taxpayer knew their receipt
69. Id. at 23-24.
70. Id. at 24.
71. For a factual discussion, see supra Part I(C). The taxpayer also challenged the tax
on the grounds that it violated his rights to equal protection of the laws. Welch, 305 U.S. at
141.
72. Welch, 305 U.S. at 146.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 147.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 147.
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would later be subjected to tax at an increased rate.77 The Court
thus attempted to distinguish gift taxation, under which donors'
actions presumably would be affected by tax consequences, from
income taxation, under which taxpayers' actions would not be so
impacted.
78
After contrasting the nature of income taxation from gift taxa-
tion, the Court analyzed the period of retroactivity to determine if
its application was "harsh and oppressive." The Court observed
that for more than 75 years, Congress regularly enacted revenue
laws to retroactively tax income received during the year preced-
ing the session in which the taxing statute was enacted, and that
such "recent transactions" could be subject to retroactive applica-
tion of tax measures. 7 9 Applying this test to the Wisconsin stat-
ute, the Court noted that while the statute was enacted two years
after the subject tax year, the Wisconsin State Legislature met
only in odd-numbered years.80 Accordingly, the 1935 legislative
session was the first opportunity after the tax year in which the
income was received to revise the tax laws applicable to 1933 in-
come (reported and paid in 1934). The Court then recognized that
while the Wisconsin Supreme Court had thought that the tax
might "approach or reach the limit of permissible retroactivity,"
the Court would not say that the retroactive period in fact ex-
ceeded such limit.8
1
The divided Welch opinion represents an important turning
point in retroactive tax jurisprudence. The Welch majority focused
its analysis on the nature of the tax and the period of retroactivity
to determine whether the retroactive application of the tax statute
was so "harsh and oppressive" as to violate due process. To date,
the period of retroactivity criteria lives on in the "modesty doc-
trine" articulated in Carlton.
8 2
For the next 45 years, the Court heard very few constitutional
challenges to retroactive tax legislation. In a 1981 per curiam de-
cision, the Court Upheld a retroactive increase in the minimum
rate of income taxation and a reduction in the exemption
amount.8 3 This measure, enacted in October 1976 as part of the
77. Welch, 305 U.S. at 148.
78. In today's era of income tax planning, this distinction appears naive and rather
artificial. See id. at 147-48.
79. Id. at 148-50.
80. Id. at 150.
81. Id. at 151.
82. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32-33.
83. U.S. v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981).
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Tax Reform Act of 1976,84 applied to the 1976 tax year forward.8 5
The Court observed that it had consistently held that application
of income tax statutes to the entire calendar year in which enact-
ment took place did not per se violate the Due Process Clause, and
that this type of retroactive application, confined to short and lim-
ited periods, was "required by the practicalities of producing na-
tional legislation. 8 6 In essence, the Court held that the period of
retroactivity for the income tax was modest and reasonable, and
therefore, the tax itself did not transgress due process limita-
tions.8
7
In upholding the retroactive application of the increased tax
rate, the Court also dismissed the taxpayer's reliance on the Nich-
ols line of cases as gift-tax cases impacting gifts that were com-
pletely vested before the enactment of the gift tax.88 Contrary to
the taxpayer's argument, the 1976 amendments to the income tax
did not create a wholly new tax governed by the stricter Nichols
analysis. Additionally, the Court applied an actual notice crite-
rion and determined that the taxpayer had adequate notice of the
proposed change in law.
8 9
3. The Legitimate Purpose Test
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.90 in 1984,
the Court shifted from the "harsh and oppressive" standard to the
"legitimate purpose" test.91 While both standards analyze the
length of the retroactivity period, the legitimate purpose test looks
to whether a legitimate, rational purpose underlies the tax legisla-
tion, as opposed to the nature of the tax, which was the second
element analyzed under the harsh and oppressive standard.
The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980
('IVPPAA")92 applied withdrawal-liability provisions to employers
withdrawing from pension plans during a five-month period prior
84. Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 301 (1976).
85. Darusmont, 449 US. at 294-95.
86. Id. at 296-97.
87. Id. at 297-301. In rejecting the taxpayer's challenge, the Court also noted that the
taxpayer had ample notice of the increase in the effective minimum rate because it had
been under public discussion for almost a year before its enactment. Id. at 299. The Court
also disagreed with the taxpayer's assertion that the tax was a new tax, as it only increased
the tax rate and decreased allowable exemptions. Id. at 299-300.
88. Id. at 299.
89. Id. at 299-300.
90. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
91. Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 717 (1984).
92. 29 U.S.C §1001 (1980).
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to the statute's enactment. 93 The effective date of the withdrawal-
liability provisions was the date on which the guaranty corpora-
tion had initially submitted its recommendations to Congress.
Congress selected this date to prevent employers from avoiding
the adverse consequences of withdrawal liability by withdrawing
from plans while the liability was being considered by Congress. 94
Following approval in committee, Congress advanced the effective
date of the measure by more than a year, as the date contained in
earlier versions of the bill had served Congress's deterrent pur-
pose. 95 Ultimately, the withdrawal-liability provisions took effect
approximately five months before the statute was enacted into
law.
9 6
In analyzing the constitutional challenge, Justice Brennan,
writing for a unanimous Court, relied on a 1976 decision 97 that
applied the legitimate purpose test in upholding the retroactivity
of a coal mine health and safety act.98 Under this rather lenient
test,99 the government need only show that the retroactive appli-
cation of the legislation was justified by a rational legislative pur-
pose. 100 In Pension Benefit, the Court found this standard easily
satisfied. There was a rational purpose behind the legislation be-
cause Congress was concerned that employers would have a
greater incentive to withdraw from the pension funds if they knew
that legislation imposing greater liability on withdrawing employ-
ers was being considered. Congress, therefore, rationally sought
to prevent employers from taking advantage of lengthy legislative
processes and withdrawing funds while Congress debated. 1 1
The Court also reviewed the period of retroactivity and found
that-like other legislation sustained by the Court-it was con-
fined to a short and limited period required by practicalities asso-
ciated with producing national legislation. 10 2 Therefore, the Court
was "loathe to reject such a common practice when conducting the
limited judicial review accorded economic legislation" under the
93. Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 720.
94. Id. at 723-24.
95. Id. at 724-25.
96. Id. at 728-29.
97. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
98. Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 728-29.
99. The Court contrasted this test from the test used to determine whether a state
action impairs preexisting contracts under the Contracts Clause. Id. at 733.
100. Id. at 730.




Due Process Clause. 0 3 Because the Act was made retroactive for
only a five-month period and supported by a rational and legiti-
mate purpose, it withstood the taxpayer's due process challenge.
10 4
In rejecting the due process challenge, the Court also turned
away from the actual notice test, indicating that notice of the
pending legislation was irrelevant to its analysis. 10 5 The taxpayer
and amici curiae had contended that the retroactive application of
the MPPAA was subject to heightened judicial scrutiny because
taxpayers did not have adequate notice of the changing tax ramifi-
cations. 10 6 The Court, however, expressed doubts that the retroac-
tive application would be invalid for lack of notice even if it had
been suddenly enacted by Congress. 0 7 Nevertheless, by conclud-
ing that the employers had adequate notice of the withdrawal li-
ability through congressional debates on the MPPAA, the Court
declined to state definitively whether actual notice of the legisla-
tion was a relevant factor.'08
A mere two years later, however, the Court reverted to the
harsh and oppressive formulation of the due process test in up-
holding statutory transitional estate and gift tax rules against a
due process challenge. 0 9 Congress enacted the transitional rule to
bridge old and new regimes of federal taxation of gifts and es-
tates.110 Its purpose was to prevent taxpayers from obtaining a
windfall of double exemptions in the four-month interim period."'
The district court had revived the Nichols line of cases, conclud-
ing that the interim rules violated due process because they ap-
plied to gifts made before the enactment of the amending legisla-
tion.112 Justice Marshall, writing for the unanimous Court, re-
versed and dismissed the value of Nichols in deciding the constitu-
tionality of amendments affecting the operation of existing tax
laws.1' 3 Once again, the Court confined the more rigorous review
103. Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 731.
104. Id. at 734.
105. Id. at 731-32.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 732. The Court explained that such "sudden" enactment by Congress could
arise through a floor amendment or rider. Id.
108. Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 732.
109. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568.
110. Id. at 569-70.
111. Id. at 562. The taxpayer contended that the statute was retroactive. The Court did
not determine the issue of whether the statutory rules were in fact retroactive in conclud-
ing that there was no due process violation. Id. at 571. The Court did, however, rely on
retroactive tax jurisprudence throughout the opinion.
112. Id. at 564.
113. Id. at 568.
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employed in Nichols and its progeny to the retroactive imposition
of wholly new taxes. In contrast, amendments to the estate and
gift tax structure were to be reviewed by considering the "nature
of the tax" in determining whether its retroactive application was
so "harsh and oppressive" as to violate the Due Process Clause. 114
Applying this test to the facts, the Court had little trouble uphold-
ing the transitional rules, particularly because the petitioners
were not financially prejudiced by passage of the act-they simply
were unable to avail themselves of a windfall that would have re-
sulted in the absence of the short transitional period created by
the legislation. 11
5
C. United States v. Carlton
In the seminal 1994 United States v. Carlton"16 decision, the
Supreme Court upheld yet another estate tax amendment against
a due process challenge. 117 The majority concluded that a 1987
amendment to the 1986 Tax Reform Act,"l8 made retroactive to the
Act's enactment in October 1986, was valid under the Due Process
Clause. 119 Perhaps most significantly, however, Justice O'Connor
issued a concurring opinion that suggested a more objective stan-
dard for determining the permissible period of retroactivity. 120 In
a frequently cited portion of the opinion, she wrote: "A period of
retroactivity longer than the year preceding the legislative session
in which the law was enacted would raise, in my view, serious
constitutional questions."'121 As discussed in Part IV below, sev-
eral state courts have relied on this concurring opinion to invali-
date state and local tax legislation with extensive periods of retro-
activity, thereby reviving the use of the Due Process Clause as a
limitation on retroactive tax provisions.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress added a new estate tax
provision applicable to any estate that filed a timely return after
October 22, 1986 (the date of the Act's enactment). This provision
granted a deduction for certain proceeds from the sale of employer
securities by an estate to an employee stock ownership plan
114. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568-69 (citing Welch, 305 U.S. at 147).
115. Id. at 570.
116. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
117. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 26.
118. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
119. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32.
120. Id. at 36-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 38; see also infra Part III(C).
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("ESOP"). For the sale to qualify for a deduction, the sale had to
be made before the date on which the estate tax return was re-
quired to be filed, including extensions.
122
Respondent Carlton, the executor of an estate, purchased 1.5
million shares of stock with estate funds on December 10, 1986.123
Carlton sold the stock two days later to an ESOP, for an amount
$631,000 less than the purchase price. 124 When he filed the estate
tax return on December 29, 1986, Carlton availed the estate of the
new ESOP deduction and claimed a deduction for half of the sale
proceeds. 25 This deduction decreased the estate tax liability by
approximately $2.5 million. 2
6
In early 1987, recognizing the unintended loophole created by
the plain language of the ESOP legislation, the IRS announced
that through pending "clarifying legislation," it would permit the
ESOP deduction only for estates of decedents who owned the stock
before death. 27 On December 22, 1987, Congress enacted the
amendment, which provided that the securities sold to an ESOP
must have been directly owned by the decedent immediately be-
fore death to qualify for the deduction. 28 This amendment was
made retroactive to October 22, 1986, the date of enactment of the
1986 Tax Reform Act.
129
Based on the 1987 legislation, the IRS disallowed Carlton's
claimed estate tax deduction. 30 Carlton paid the assessment and
pursued a claim for refund, contending that the retroactive appli-
cation of the legislation violated the Due Process Clause.' 31 A di-
vided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a notice
test, concluding that Carlton did not have actual or constructive
notice of the retroactive amendment of the statute at the time he
entered into the transaction and that he thereby reasonably relied
to his detriment on the legislation. 32 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit




126. Id. at 28.
127. IRS Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432 at 442.
128. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29.
129. Id. The amending legislation was included as part of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1987, § 10411(a).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 27.
132. U.S. v. Carlton, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992).
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majority concluded that retroactive application of the amendment
was unconstitutional.
133
1. Justice Blackmun's Majority Opinion
Writing for the Supreme Court majority, Justice Blackmun ob-
served that the Court repeatedly had upheld retroactive tax legis-
lation against due process challenges. 134 In an apparent effort to
reconcile the different tests applied by the Court over the years,
the opinion characterized the harsh and oppressive formulation
135
as no different than the legitimate purpose test 136 recently applied
to tax measures and traditionally used in assessing the constitu-
tionality of economic legislation. 137 The Court clarified that the
due process test applicable to retroactive tax statutes is, therefore,
the same as the test generally applied to retroactive economic leg-
islation-namely, whether the retroactive application of the stat-
ute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by
rational means.
38
Applying this test to the 1987 amendment, the Court first con-
cluded that the retroactive application to October 1986 was sup-
ported by a legitimate, non-arbitrary purpose. 39 In particular, the
retroactive application was intended to cure a drafting defect in
the 1986 legislation. 40 Through the ESOP deduction, Congress
had intended to encourage stockholders to sell their companies to
their employees, rather than permit executors to drastically re-
duce estate tax liability by purchasing stock and immediately re-
selling it to an ESOP.' 41 Indeed, the estimated revenue loss with-
out the 1987 amendment was more than 20 times greater than
anticipated. 42 Congress therefore did not have an improper mo-
tive in stemming the revenue loss by retroactively closing the
loophole. 143
Critically, in determining whether the statute was supported by
rational means, the Court also analyzed the period of retroactiv-
133. Carlton, 512 U.S at 29; 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992).
134. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30.
135. Id. (citing Welch, 305 U.S. at 147, and Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568-69).
136. See Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 720.
137. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30.
138. Id. at 30-31.
139. Id. at 32.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 31.




ity. The majority concluded that Congress acted promptly and
established only a modest period of retroactivity. 144 Relying on the
Court's prior decisions upholding retroactive tax legislation con-
fined to short periods "required by the practicalities of producing
national legislation,"'145 the Court concluded that the period of ret-
roactivity-slightly more than one year-was modest.146 In par-
ticular, the Court endorsed the Welch Court's prior legislative ses-
sion test. 47 The Court also observed that the amendment had
been proposed by the IRS since January 1987, only two months
following the effective date of the 1986 legislation. 48
Despite the relatively short period of retroactivity, it was undis-
puted that Carlton had no actual or constructive notice of the
amendment to the ESOP deduction because he sold the stock in
December 1986, prior to the IRS notice. 49 Critically, however, the
Court determined that Carlton's lack of notice of the 1987
amendment and detrimental reliance on the original statute alone
were insufficient to create a constitutional violation. 150 In an oft-
cited statement, the majority opined that "[t]ax legislation is not a
promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Reve-
nue Code." 1
51
The Court confirmed that the Nichols approach "has long since
been discarded" and, to the extent viable, pertains only to the
creation of a wholly new tax. 152 Moreover, in rejecting Carlton's
argument that retroactive estate and gift tax legislation be ana-
lyzed under a stricter test than retroactive income tax legislation,
the Court confirmed that the nature of the tax at issue is not dis-
positive. 53 The Court therefore reversed the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion, which had relied exclusively on the notice test, and held that
the retroactive application of the 1987 amendments to October
1986 satisfied the Due Process Clause.154
144. Id.
145. Id. at 33 (citing Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 296-97; and Welch, 305 U.S. at 150).
146. Id. at 33.
147. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 28.
150. Id. at 34 (citing Welch, 305 U.S. at 134 and Milliken, 283 U.S. at 15).
151. Id. at 33.
152. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34 (citing Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 35.
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2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor criticized the major-
ity's focus on the "curative" nature of the 1987 amendment as
support for finding a legitimate purpose. 155 Observing that any
statute amending an existing law is intended to fix a perceived
problem with the existing law, Justice O'Connor concluded that
retroactive application of revenue measures are by their nature
rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of rais-
ing revenue. 15
6
The concurring opinion acknowledged the wholly new tax excep-
tion. For instance, the retroactive application of a wholly new tax
is arbitrary, even though it would raise revenue. 5 7 As the tax
consequences of commercial transactions are relevant and some-
times dispositive considerations in taxpayers' business decisions,
it is arbitrary to tax transactions that were not subject to taxation
at the time the taxpayer entered into them.158 While the retroac-
tive application of increased tax rates or the elimination of deduc-
tions could have similar effects on taxpayers who reasonably re-
lied on the existing legislation, the concurring opinion recognized
the Court's precedent, holding that Congress must have some abil-
ity to make retroactive adjustments as a means of equalizing
revenue and budgetary requirements. 59
Critically, the concurring opinion also suggested that a more ob-
jective test be applied to the period of retroactivity.160 Justice
O'Connor first noted that "[t]he governmental interest in revising
the tax laws must at some point give way to the taxpayer's inter-
est in finality and repose."16' In every case in which the Court
upheld retroactive federal tax statutes against due process chal-
lenges, the law applied retroactively for only a relatively short pe-
riod. Although the retroactivity periods generally were less than
one year, 62 those periods greater than a year in length were made
in the first legislative session following the tax year in question.163
Therefore, Justice O'Connor stated her belief that a retroactivity
155. Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 37.
157. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 38.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 38.
161. Id. at 37-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 37-38 (citing Hemme 476 U.S. at 568 (1 month); Darusmont,
449 U.S. at 292 (10 months); and Hudson, 299 U.S. at 501 (1 month)).
163. Id. (citing Welch, 305 U.S. at 134).
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period longer than the year before the enacting legislative session
would raise serious constitutional issues. 164  Since the 1987
amendment was enacted the year following the original legisla-
tion, given the Court's precedents, Justice O'Connor concurred
that the retroactive application of the estate tax amendment did
not violate due process.
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment based on his belief
that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not protect
substantive due process. 165 In dicta, his opinion went further by
applying the actual notice and detrimental reliance test, leading to
a conclusion that-if there were such a thing as substantive due
process-the retroactive application of the 1987 amendment would
violate it because Carlton obviously relied on the prior law to the
estate's detriment. 166 Additionally, Justice Scalia predicted that
the majority's reasoning would guarantee that all retroactive tax
laws would henceforth be valid.167 As will be seen below in Part
III, this prediction proved erroneous.
III. POST-CARLTON: THE MODESTY DOCTRINE
A. Retroactivity Periods of Less Than One Year Have Been Up-
held
Due process challenges to retroactive federal and state tax legis-
lation consistently have failed in the post-Carlton era when the
period of retroactivity was one year or less. For instance, shortly
after Carlton was announced, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the constitutionality of an amendment subjecting
loan proceeds received from qualified corporate pension plans to
income taxation.168 The period of retroactivity was limited to one
month.169 Nonetheless, the taxpayer asserted that the taxation of
the loan proceeds in question was a "wholly new tax" and there-
fore invalid under the Nichols line of authority. 170 In rejecting the
164. Id.
165. Id. at 39.
166. Id. at 39.
167. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. Furlong v. Comm'r of Revenue, 36 F.3d 25 (7th Cir. 1994).
169. Furlong, 36 F.3d at 27 n.2.
170. Id. at 28; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 13-14, Furlong v. Conm'r of Revenue, No.
93-3668 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 1994).
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taxpayer's characterization of the tax measure, the court deter-
mined that the change in the income tax was reasonably foresee-
able at the time the taxpayer obtained the loan proceeds, and
therefore, the amendment was not a wholly new tax subject to
strict scrutiny. 171 Relying on Carlton, the Court had little trouble
finding that the goals of raising revenue and preventing taxpayers
from taking advantage of a prospective change in the law consti-
tuted legitimate purposes for the retroactive impact of the legisla-
tion.172 Further, the very limited period of retroactivity demon-
strated that the legislative purpose was backed by reasonable
means. 1
73
Also at the federal level, two lower federal courts upheld the
1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act's 174 retroactive increase
in the estate tax rate.' 75 The period of retroactivity was eight
months. 176 Based on Carlton, the courts determined that the pe-
riod of retroactivity was short and limited.' 77 The courts also re-
lied on Carlton in concluding that retroactive tax legislation may
be backed solely by the rational, legitimate purposes of raising
revenue and promoting taxpayer equity. 178 As Justice O'Connor
observed, the conclusion essentially validates every retroactive tax
measure under the legitimate purpose test.
179
Retroactive state tax measures with relatively short periods of
retroactivity also have routinely been upheld since 1994. For in-
stance, the Arizona Legislature's amendment retroactively reduc-
ing an alternative fuel tax credit was sustained over the taxpay-
ers' due process challenge. 80 The amendment retroactively elimi-
nated a tax credit equal to 30%-50% of the purchase price of the
vehicle.' 81 Under the amendment, the credit was retroactively
limited to the total costs of converting a vehicle to alternative
171. Furlong, 36 F.3d at 27-28.
172. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 29.
174. Section 13208 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub.
L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 469.
175. Quarty v. U.S., 170 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 1999); Kane v. U.S., 942 F. Supp. 233 (E.D.
Pa. 1996).
176. Quarty, 170 F.3d at 968; Kane, 942 F. Supp. at 234.
177. Quarty, 170 F.3d at 968; Kane, 942 F. Supp. at 234.
178. Quarty, 170 F.3d at 967-68 (rejecting taxpayer's argument that the increase in the
estate tax rate, which was not a curative measure, impacted the determination of whether
the legislation had a legitimate purpose); Kane, 942 F. Supp. at 234.
179. Quarty, 170 F.3d at 967; see supra note 179 and accompanying text.
180. Baker, 105 P.3d at 1183-84.
181. Id. at 1182.
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fuel.18 2 The period of retroactivity was eight months. 8 3 Rejecting
the taxpayers' argument that the retroactive application of the
law violated their due process rights, the Arizona Court of Appeals
held that the retroactive application of the tax was backed by the
legitimate legislative purpose of closing a loophole under the exist-
ing law, and further, that the eight-month period of retroactivity
was modest. 184
B. Several Decisions Have Upheld Tax Legislation and Regula-
tions Containing Retroactivity Periods of Greater Than One
Year
Following Carlton, several federal and state courts upheld tax
legislation containing retroactivity periods greater than one year
in length. In most of these cases, the courts either did not fully
apply the Carlton modesty doctrine or upheld retroactive federal
tax regulations, which generally were accorded more lenient due
process review than statutes.
For instance, in Montana Rail Link, Inc. v. United States,18 5 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the retroactive application
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("1989
OBRA")186 to employer contributions made to the Railroad Re-
tirement Tax Act ("RRTA")' 87 in 1987 and 1988.188 Congress had
retroactively barred refund claims by employers that had previ-
ously paid RRTA tax on their employer 401(k) contributions. 8 9
Without the period of retroactivity, the railroad workers' retire-
ment funds and benefits would have been jeopardized.1 90 Indeed,
some employees had already received benefits based on the
amounts paid into the funds and credited to the accounts for the
period in issue.1 91 Although the petitioners challenged the retro-
182. Id. The taxpayers had their four motor homes converted to alternative fuels at a
combined cost of $31,000. Id. Under the pre-amendment law, the taxpayers were entitled
to a tax credit equal to the total cost plus $92,750, which represented a portion of the pur-
chase price of the vehicles. Id. at 1183. After the amendment, the credit amount was lim-
ited to $31,000. Id. at 1182.
183. Id. at 1187.
184. Id.
185. 76 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1996).
186. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
187. Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U.S.C. § 3231 (1983). This act is the So-
cial Security Act equivalent for railroad employees. Id.
188. Montana Rail, 76 F.3d at 994-95.
189. Id. at 993.
190. OBRA § 10206(c)(2)(A)(ii); Id. at 993.
191. Montana Rail, 76 F.3d at 993.
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active application of the 1989 OBRA to their refund claims for tax
years 1987 and 1988, the Act retroactively barred refund claims
back to 1983, a period of up to six years.192 In upholding the ret-
roactive application of the 1989 OBRA, the Ninth Circuit focused
on the harm Congress attempted to prevent in protecting the re-
tirement funds of the railroad workers and concluded that the
1989 OBRA had a legitimate legislative purpose.
193
The court did not, however, strictly apply the second prong of
the Carlton test. Instead, it reasoned that a shorter period of ret-
roactivity would have benefitted only some of the employees and
that a period of retroactivity to 1983 salvaged all employees' re-
tirement funds and reliance on the prior employer contributions.
The court therefore concluded that the statute's period of retroac-
tivity bore a rational relationship to the legitimate legislative pur-
pose it was trying to achieve.
194
Additionally, several lower federal court decisions have sus-
tained federal tax regulations containing retroactivity periods
longer than one year. However, those decisions emphasized that,
contrary to tax statutes, which typically act prospectively, federal
tax regulations are often applied retroactively. 95 Federal regula-
tions are therefore governed by a more lenient standard of review
under the Carlton modesty doctrine. For instance, the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld a six-year period of retroactivity con-
tained in a Treasury Regulation. 96 The Court observed that un-
der the Internal Revenue Code, 197 Treasury Regulations were
statutorily presumed to operate retroactively. 98 Accordingly, a
different test applies in determining whether a retroactive federal
tax regulation has a modest look-back period. Specifically, courts
look to whether the regulation actually effects a change in law or
192. Id.
193. Id. at 994.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm'r, 87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996); A. Tarricone, Inc. v.
U.S., 4 F.Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Comm'r, 41 F.3d
130 (3d Cir. 1994) (upholding 15-year period of retroactive application); Rutter v. Comm'r,
760 F.2d 466, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding five-year period of retroactive application).
196. Tate, 87 F.3d at 107.
197. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1998). This provision provides: 'The Secretary may prescribe the
extent, if any, to which any ruling or [regulation] relating to the internal revenue laws,
shall be applied without retroactive effect." Congress therefore demonstrated its intent
that treasury regulations are to apply retroactively, absent express language otherwise.
Tate, 87 F.3d at 107. In 1996, Congress amended this statute to limit the Secretary's au-
thority to impose regulations retroactively where the regulations interpreted statutory
provisions enacted after 1996. A. Tarricone, Inc., 4 F.Supp. 2d at 326, n.2.
198. Tate, 87 F.3d at 107.
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policy, and whether the taxpayer detrimentally and reasonably
relied on the prior regulation. 199 Many regulations clarify am-
biguous statutes and unsettled law, and, therefore, the retroactive
application of the regulation may not effect a change in law.
Likewise, the existing, ambiguous law is not as likely to produce
reasonable, detrimental reliance by the taxpayer.
200
At the state level, at least two courts have upheld tax measures
with retroactivity periods greater than one year. In Monroe v.
Valhalla Cemetery Co., 201 the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals up-
held a use tax statute with a retroactivity period of two to three
years.20 2 Several administrative rulings had revealed a loophole
in Alabama's sales and use tax law, whereby sales of goods deliv-
ered into the state from out-of-state vendors were not subject to
the state's use tax.203 In cases where the vendors had insufficient
contacts with the state, no state sales tax could be lawfully applied
either.20 4 In 1997, the state enacted legislation that closed the
loophole and applied the act retroactively for all open tax years.
20 5
The retroactivity provision therefore prevented taxpayers from
seeking certain use tax refunds for the two- to three-year period
that would otherwise have been open.20 6 On appeal, the trial court
ruled the two- to three-year period excessive and upheld the tax-
payer's due process challenge.
20 7
In reversing the trial court and rejecting the taxpayer's consti-
tutional challenge, the state appellate court first found that there
was a legitimate legislative purpose behind the act and that the
legislation merely "clarified" the legislature's intent.208 Second, in
summary fashion, the court concluded that the period of retroac-
tivity was modest. The court relied on Alabama precedent that
had upheld a tax assessment with a retroactivity period of eight
years. 20 9 Additionally, the court was swayed by the fact that with-
199. Id. at 107-108; A. Tarricone, 4 F.Supp. 2d at 326.
200. A. Tarricone, 4 F.Supp. 2d at 326-27.
201. 749 So. 2d 470, 473 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022 (2000) (over-
ruled on other grounds, Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137 (Ala. 2002)).
202. Monroe, 749 So.2d at 475.
203. Id. at 472.
204. Id.
205. Id. The new legislation "clarified" that the current law exempted from use tax only
that property sold at retail in Alabama on which sales tax had already been paid. Act. No.
97-301, § 2.
206. Monroe, 749 So.2d at 473; § 40-2A-7(c)(2).
207. Monroe, 749 So.2d at 473.
208. Id. at 474.
209. Id. (citing Smith v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 672 So. 2d 794 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (court
concluded legislation was a clarification); Maples v. McDonald, 668 So.2d 790 (Ala. Civ.
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out the retroactive application of the legislation, taxpayer refunds
for the open period would create a considerable strain on the state
budget. 2
10
More recently (December 2008), in Enterprise Leasing Co. of
Phoenix v. Arizona Dep't of Revenue,211 the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals upheld a tax statute with a six-year period of retroactivity.
In 1994, the Arizona State Legislature authorized a pollution con-
trol equipment income tax credit allowed against taxes incurred
by a taxpayer when purchasing real or personal property that is
used to control or prevent pollution.212 Five years later, the De-
partment of Revenue received its first claim for a credit for
equipment attached to a motor vehicle. 213 It soon became appar-
ent that the tax credit would cost the state considerably more than
expected, and in April 2000, the Legislature amended the statute
to provide that the credit does not apply to the purchase of any
personal property attached to a motor vehicle.214 In somewhat
contradictory terms, the legislation provided that the amendment
amounted to a "clarifying change" that (1) was "consistent with
the legislature's intent when [the credit was] enacted," (2) was
intended "to close loopholes," and (3) was "to apply retroactively to
taxable years beginning from and after December 31, 1994."215 In
March 2000, the taxpayer filed refund claims, claiming the credit
for personal property attached to motor vehicles. 21 6 After the
claims were denied, the taxpayer challenged the retroactivity of
the legislation under the substantive Due Process Clause.
The Arizona Court of Appeals first characterized the legislation
as "curative" in light of the legislative statement that the amend-
ment was a clarification of legislative intent.217 Therefore, the
App. 1995) (same)). Although these cases post-date Carlton, neither case cited Carlton or
the modesty doctrine. See Smith, 672 So.2d at 795-800; Maples, 668 So.2d at 791-93.
Moreover, the constitutional analysis in both cases is thin. Id.
210. Monroe, 749 So.2d at 475.
211. No. 1 CA-TX 06-0017, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 168 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2008).
This opinion is also available on Westlaw, under 2008 WL 5237810, but the page numbers
in the following citations are derived from LexisNexis. On January 22, 2009, plain-
tiff/appellant Enterprise Leasing Co. filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme
Court. See CLERK OF THE COURT, ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION ONE,
http://www.cofad1.state.az.us/easefiles/tx/TX060017.pdf (last visited May 5, 2009).
212. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1170 (1994) (amended 1995, 2000, & 2005).
213. Enterprise Leasing, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 168, at *3.
214. 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws 405, at *21. The cost of the credit went from approximately
$2.5 million to $15 million annually. Enterprise Leasing, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 168, at *3.
215. Enterprise Leasing, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 168, at *4 (internal citations omitted).
216. Id. at *4.
217. Id. at *6-*8.
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Court reasoned, "the amendment did not retroactively abolish a
right."218 Then, relying on the Carlton majority opinion, the Court
held that, even if the amendment was not curative, it passed con-
stitutional muster because it was supported by a legitimate legis-
lative purpose (fixing a perceived loophole to minimize exposure to
refund claims) and was furthered by rational means.219 In uphold-
ing the amendment under the modesty doctrine, the Court incor-
porated actual notice/detrimental reliance and vested rights issues
into its analysis and relied on judicial precedent upholding tax
measures with retroactivity periods longer than one year.220 The
Court also declined to impose a one-year "talismanic cutoff' be-
cause such a notion arose from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Carlton-not the majority opinion. 221  The Enterprise Court pro-
ceeded to observe that some leeway must exist for retroactivity
longer than a year "so long as the legislature acts at the earliest
notice or opportunity. '222 Because the department of revenue had
not received any pollution control equipment tax credit claims for
motor vehicles until December 1999, the Court reasoned that the
Legislature acted promptly by enacting the amendment in April
2000.223
C. Several State Cases Have Struck Tax Measures with Retroac-
tivity Periods of Greater Than One Year
In the post-Carlton era, at least three state appellate court deci-
sions have held that tax measures with retroactivity periods of
greater than one year violated due process. 224 Each of these cases
cited Justice O'Connor's Carlton concurrence and concluded that
the tax provisions at issue violated the modesty doctrine.
218. Id. at *8. This analysis demonstrates the danger of upholding the constitutionality
of "curative" retroactive tax measures. Every retroactive tax measure seeks to cure a per-
ceived defect in existing law. If the "curative" intent is used as a judicial criterion, by at-
taching the label "curative" and divining the intent of a prior legislature, a legislature can
ensure that the measure will pass due process scrutiny.
219. Id. at *8-*12.
220. Enterprise Leasing, 2008 LEXIS 168, at *10-*12,
221. Id. at*13.
222. Id. at *16.
223. Id. at *16-*17.
224. At the trial court level, on April 17, 2009, the Michigan Court of Claims relied on
Carlton's modesty doctrine and held that legislation seeking to retroactively invalidate
refund claims dating back 11 years "clearly violated" due process. Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Dep't of Treasury, No. 07-151-MT (Mich. Ct. Cl. 2009).
318 Vol. 47
Retroactive Tax Legislation
In Rivers v. State,225 the South Carolina Supreme Court invali-
dated legislation with a retroactivity period of two to three
years. 226 A 1988 act had retroactively decreased the capital gains
tax rate.227 A year later, an amendment retroactively limited the
period of the lower tax rate and provided that the refund would be
made in two equal annual installments, with the first refund to be
issued in 1990.228 Then, in 1991, the legislature amended the
capital gains tax yet again, this time retroactively reducing each
refund by 50%. This amendment would have divested taxpayers
of the one-half of their refunds they had not already received.
229
The litigant taxpayers, who had realized capital gains in the sub-
ject period between January 1 and June 22 of 1987, brought suit
because the 1991 amendment retroactively eliminated the portion
of the 1987 tax year refund they had not yet received. 2
30
Citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the 1991 act violated both the federal and
state due process clauses because the period of retroactivity was
not modest.231 The court determined that depending on whether
the calculation of retroactivity went back to the 1989 amendment
or the original 1988 legislation, the period of retroactivity was at
least two (and possibly three) years in length.232 In holding the
legislation unconstitutional, the court observed: "At some point,
however, the government's interest in meeting its revenue re-
quirements must yield to taxpayers' interest in finality regarding
tax liabilities and credits."233 The Rivers Court determined that
tipping point had been reached and that, under the facts and cir-
cumstances, the retroactivity period was "simply excessive." 234 In
concluding that the period violated the modesty doctrine, the court
qualified its holding by stating that it did not suggest that every
retroactivity period of two to three years or more was per se un-
reasonable. 235
225. 490 S.E.2d 261 (S.C. 1997).
226. Rivers, 490 S.E.2d 261.
227. Id. at 262; Act No. 658, 1988 S.C. Acts 658, Part II § 27. The legislation reduced
the tax rate for the period January 1, 1987, through January 31, 1988.
228. Rivers, 490 S.E.2d at 262. The period was reduced to the time between January 1,
1987 and June 22, 1987.
229. Id. Act. No. 171, 1991 S.C. Acts 171, Part II, § 6.
230. Rivers, 490 S.E.2d at 262.
231. Id. at 263-64.
232. Id. at 265.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Rivers, 490 S.E.2d at 265 n.4.
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In the 2005 decision City of Modesto v. National Med, Inc.,236 the
California Court of Appeal held that a city's attempt to retroac-
tively impose revenue apportionment guidelines in an effort to
moot out a pending refund claim violated the modesty doctrine.
237
A trial court had previously held that the city's business license
tax ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the taxpayer be-
cause it imposed tax on business activities occurring outside of the
city.23 8 Following the ruling, the city amended its business license
tax ordinance in 2002 to provide for apportionment. 239 More than
a year later, in September 2003, the city council enacted appor-
tionment guidelines. 240 The city sought to retroactively impose the
ordinance amendment and the apportionment guidelines to all tax
refund claims, including pending claims.241 The retroactive appli-
cation of the 2002 amendment and the 2003 apportionment guide-
lines would therefore have had the effect of substantially reducing
the tax refund the petitioner would receive for the tax years at
issue (1996-2000).242 Then, in 2004, in an attempt to cover the tax
deficiency assessment the city had previously issued to the peti-
tioner, the city enacted yet another set of apportionment guide-
lines, seeking to impose the guidelines retroactively to all pending
assessments. 2
43
The California appellate court held that the city's attempt to
retroactively impose the apportionment amendment and guide-
lines violated Carlton's modesty doctrine because the retroactive
application was four to eight years in the past.244 The taxpayer
had first claimed in February 2000 that the business license tax
was unconstitutional. The city did not amend its ordinance to
provide for apportionment until August 2002. A year passed be-
fore the city enacted its first set of apportionment guidelines, and
then another year passed before the city promulgated guidelines
in an attempt to impact the pending assessment. 245 In an under-
236. 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
237. Modesto, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 217.
238. Id. at 217. The ordinance's failure to apportion in-city and out-of-city gross receipts
violated the requirements of equal protection and due process because the tax discrimi-
nated against inter-city business. Id. at 219 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Shell Oil Co., 4
Cal.3d 108 (1971)).
239. Id. at 218.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 219.
242. Modesto, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 217, 220.
243. Id. at 221.




statement, the court concluded that "the City cannot be found to
have acted promptly. 246
Moreover, in addition to finding that the city did not act
promptly, the court held that the total period of retroactivity was
not modest. The city sought to impose the 2004 guidelines retro-
actively up to eight years.247 Noting that California courts have
upheld the retroactive application of tax laws only where the ret-
roactivity was limited to the current tax year,248 and citing the
O'Connor Carlton concurrence, the City of Modesto Court con-
cluded that the period of retroactivity violated the modesty doc-
trine.
Lastly, in Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Rudolph,249 decided in 2006,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that the Common-
wealth's efforts to retroactively eliminate taxpayers' pending ad-
ministrative claims for overpayment of income tax violated the
taxpayers' right to due process. 250 A 1994 decision of the Kentucky
Supreme Court had overturned the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet's
policy of not permitting unitary income tax returns. 251 The tax-
payers thereafter filed amended income tax returns and sought
refunds of taxes overpaid as a result of the Commonwealth's
unlawful policy of prohibiting unitary returns.252 These refund
claims languished at the administrative level until 2000, when the
legislature, alarmed at the growing size of the refund claims,
passed H.B. 541,253 which sought to extinguish all refund claims
filed from December 22, 1994, to December 31, 1995, that were




247. Modesto, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 222.
248. Id. (citing Gutknecht v. City of Sausalito, 117 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)).
249. No. 2004-CA-001566-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
250. 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 at *31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (review granted by Rudolph v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., No.2006-SC-0416-DG, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 195 (Ky. Oct. 24, 2007) and
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Burnside, No. 2007-SC-0819-DG, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 276 (Ky., Dec.
12, 2007)). Johnson, No. 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132.
251. GTE v. Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. 1994). A unitary business is "[a]
business that has subsidiaries in other states or countries and that calculates its state
income tax by determining what portion of a subsidiary's income is attributable to activities
within the state, and paying taxes on that percentage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (8th
ed. 2004). A unitary tax is "[a] tax of income earned locally by a business that transacts
business through an affiliated company outside the state or country." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1223 (8th ed. 2004).
252. Johnson Controls, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 at *3.
253. H.B. 541, Gen. Assem., Reg.Sess (Ky.2000).
254. Johnson Controls, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 at *5. H.B. 541 amended KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 141.200(9) (West 2005) to provide that "no claim for refund or credit of a tax
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals applied Carlton's two-part
test 255 and concluded that the five- to nine-year period of retroac-
tivity in H.B. 541 was excessive. 256 The court first concluded that
the act was enacted for the legitimate purpose of preventing a sig-
nificant revenue loss. 257 However, the court held that while "no
hard and fast rule exists for what is or is not a permissibly modest
period of retroactivity ... Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Carlton sets forth a bright line one-year limitation on the permis-
sible period of retroactivity for a taxation statute."258 The court
therefore held that H.B. 541's period of retroactivity violated the
modesty doctrine. 259 In so holding, the court observed that, had
the general assembly enacted the act in 1996-its first session
following the 1994 decision-the outcome of the appeal "may
well have been different. 26 °
The Commonwealth appealed the Johnson Controls decision to
the Kentucky Supreme Court, where the case is still pending.26
1
IV. TOWARD A BRIGHT LINE - A ONE-YEAR REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION
Three state court decisions-Rivers, City of Modesto, and John-
son Controls-invalidated tax measures containing retroactivity
periods longer than one year. These decisions have established
that Carlton did not represent the end of due process as a limita-
tion on retroactive tax legislation, as some commentators be-
lieved.262 Indeed, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, cited by all
overpayment for any taxable year ending on or before December 31, 1995, made by an
amended return or any other method after December 22, 1994, and based on a change from
any initially filed separate return or returns to a combined return under the unitary busi-
ness concept or to a consolidated return, shall be effective or recognized for any purpose."
Id. at *5-6. A consolidated return is "[a] return that reflects combined financial information
for a group of affiliated corporations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1226 (8th ed. 2004). This
legislation would have had the effect of retroactively defeating all such refund claims.
Johnson Controls, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 at *5. Legislation passed in 1996 had abol-
ished unitary returns for 1996 and subsequent tax years. Id. at *4.
255. Johnson Controls, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 at *18. The court rejected the state's
argument that there was no modesty doctrine in Carlton. Id. at *19 n. 32.
256. Id. at *21-22 n. 37.
257. Id. at *19-20.
258. Id. at *21 n. 36.
259. Id. at *24-25. The Court cited Rivers, supra note 212, and City of Modesto, supra
note 223, with approval.
260. Johnson Controls, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 at *24.
261. See supra note 237.
262. Immediately after Carlton, many articles, notes, and comments were published,
several predicting the unfettered use of retroactive tax measures in the post-Carlton era.
See supra note 3.
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three state courts, revived application of the Due Process Clause
to retroactive tax measures by suggesting that retroactive tax leg-
islation that extends beyond the year preceding the enactment of
the tax legislation violates taxpayers' rights to substantive due
process. This section of the article proposes that Justice
O'Connor's analysis become firmly embedded into judicial scrutiny
of retroactive tax measures.
A. Tax Legislation Retroactive to the Year Preceding the Passage
of the Legislation Is Presumptively Constitutional
With few exceptions, tax measures containing retroactivity peri-
ods of roughly one year or less have been sustained over constitu-
tional challenges. The courts have made it clear that no legiti-
mate basis exists to assert that tax legislation applied retroac-
tively is inherently unconstitutional. When the legislation con-
tains a modest look-back period of approximately one year or less,
the judiciary has almost universally determined that the period of
retroactivity was legitimate and reasonable under the Due Process
Clause and therefore was not so harsh as to transgress constitu-
tional limitations. It is therefore reasonable to interpret the juris-
prudence as affording a rebuttable presumption of constitutional-
ity to tax legislation applying retroactively to only the calendar
year preceding the legislation.
26 3
Upholding tax legislation with a period of retroactivity of about
one year or less gives Congress, as well as state and local legisla-
tive bodies, the ability to promptly cure perceived loopholes and
defects in tax legislation without suffering a significant loss in
revenue. This presumption also accounts for the practicalities of
producing national legislation and allows Congress the authority
to prevent parties from undermining the ends Congress is at-
tempting to achieve by acting before the legislation takes effect.
263. The recently proposed "AIG bonus tax" legislation seeks to impose a surtax on cer-
tain bonuses paid after December 31, 2008, to any executive earning in excess of
$250,000-if the bonus was paid by a company that received $5 billion or more in taxpayer
dollars from the Troubled Asset Relief Program. JEANNE SAHADI, CNNMONEY.coM, BONUS
TAX: FEELS GOOD, BUT IS IT? (March 20, 2009),
http://money.cnn.tv/2009/O3/19/news/economylbonus-tax-policy/index.htm; RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE, IS THE BONUS TAx UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
(March 26, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123802257323941925.html. While one
could argue that the surtax is a "wholly new tax," the period of retroactivity (assuming
congressional passage in 2009) would be less than a year and therefore presumptively
constitutional under this test. The legislation is potentially subject to other constitutional




Although such legislation often undermines taxpayer expecta-
tions, the relatively limited period of retroactivity diminishes this
unfairness and interference with reasonable expectations. Fur-
thermore, a relatively modest period of retroactivity included in a
measure intended to amend recently enacted legislation mini-
mizes the likelihood that a taxpayer has detrimentally and rea-
sonably relied on the prior version of the law.
This presumption of constitutionality is merely a rebuttable
presumption, however. First, a wholly new tax applied retroac-
tively violates due process regardless of the length of the period of
retroactivity. Wholly new retroactive taxes were invalidated in
the Nichols line of authority (invalidating new estate and gift tax
provisions applied retroactively). 264 The courts have confined the
Nichols analysis to wholly new retroactive taxes.265 The issue of
what constitutes a "wholly new tax" is not entirely clear, however,
and courts generally have rejected taxpayer contentions that the
tax legislation in question represents such a tax.266 Certainly, a
tax that did not previously exist in any form would qualify as a
wholly new tax. Wyoming, for instance, currently has no income
tax and would therefore not be permitted to retroactively impose
such a tax under the wholly new tax doctrine. Likewise, a state
legislature or municipality would not be permitted to retroactively
impose sales or use tax on transactions that were plainly outside
the scope of the tax at the time they occurred.
A second, non-constitutional exception to the presumptive valid-
ity of tax measures containing modest periods of retroactivity lies
in New Jersey's current application of the common-law "manifest
injustice" doctrine to retroactive taxation.267 The doctrine of mani-
fest injustice is "designed to prevent unfair results that do not
necessarily violate any constitutional provision. ' 268 In February
2008, a divided New Jersey Supreme Court struck down a state
estate tax amendment with a retroactive period of six months.
269
The taxpayers had abandoned their constitutional challenges to
the measure during the appeal process, and they instead argued
that application of the amendment to the subject estates was un-
fair and inequitable because the decedents were unable to change
264. See supra Part HI(A).
265. See, e.g., Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31; Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568.
266. See, e.g., Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299-300.
267. Oberhand v. Dir. Div. of Taxation, 940 A.2d 1202, 1209 (N.J. 2008).
268. Id. at 1210 (citations omitted).
269. Id. at 1211.
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their wills and thereby had their reasonable expectations de-
feated.270 In striking the amendment under the manifest injustice
doctrine, the plurality concluded that the public interest in dimin-
ishing the loss in revenue was outweighed by the patently reason-
able reliance of the decedents on the prior law and that it would be
harsh and unfair to apply the amendment retroactively.
271
The dissent observed that other courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, applied the doctrine of manifest injustice
only in the determination of whether a statute was in fact retroac-
tive.2 7 2 Where the legislative intent to apply a law retroactively is
clear, a court should apply the law as written, subject to constitu-
tional limitations.273 However, if it is unclear whether a legisla-
tive body intended a statute to operate retroactively, the doctrine
of manifest injustice requires the statute to apply prospectively
only. The doctrine only constitutes a canon of statutory interpre-
tation, reasoned the dissent.
274
The New Jersey judiciary's use of the doctrine of manifest injus-
tice as a substantive legal theory to invalidate retroactive legisla-
tion, while novel and enhancing settled expectations, appears at
odds with the United States Supreme Court's precedent and the
historical use of the doctrine as a canon of statutory construc-
tion. 275 Accordingly, while the doctrine may continue to be suc-
cessfully employed in New Jersey to invalidate inequitable retro-
active tax legislation, it is unlikely it will be extended to other
state or federal courts.
Lastly, it should be noted that retroactive taxation with limited
periods of retroactivity may violate state constitutional provisions
prohibiting all forms of retrospective legislation. For instance, a
Colorado constitutional provision prohibits both ex post facto and
retrospective civil legislation.276 In general, legislation is retro-
spective if it "destroys or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past."277 By their nature, retroactive tax measures
270. Id. at 1207, 1211.
271. Id. at 1211.
272. Oberhand, 940 A.2d at 1215 (Long, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801)).
273. Id. at 1212; Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
274. Oberhand, 940 A.2d at 1215-16.
275. Id. (Long, J., dissenting) (discussing history of doctrine).
276. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
277. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 (internal citation omitted).
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create new obligations or impose new duties with respect to trans-
actions or considerations already past.278 Therefore, in states with
constitutional provisions prohibiting retrospective legislation, a
retroactive tax measure may survive federal substantive due proc-
ess scrutiny, only to be invalidated as unconstitutional retrospec-
tive legislation under state law.
B. Tax Legislation Containing a Period of Retroactivity Extend-
ing Beyond the Year Preceding the Legislation Is Presump-
tively Unconstitutional
On the other end of the spectrum, tax legislation enacted in the
post-Carlton era containing periods of retroactivity greater than
one year often has been invalidated under the Due Process
Clause.2
79
Admittedly, several post-Carlton decisions have upheld retroac-
tive tax legislation containing periods of retroactivity in excess of
one year. In Montana Rail Link, the Ninth Circuit upheld the ret-
roactive application of the 1989 OBRA, where the period of retro-
activity was up to six years. There, however, the court did not
rigorously apply the modesty doctrine from Carlton and was
plainly animated by the need to protect the retirement funds of
railroad workers. 280 Additionally, in Monroe, the Alabama appel-
late court relied on two 1995 state court decisions in concluding
that the two- to three-year period of retroactivity did not violate
the Due Process Clause. However, neither of the 1995 state court
decisions relied on by Monroe applied Carlton's modesty doctrine.
Moreover, the courts reasoned that the subject legislation clarified
the exemption statutes at issue and therefore may not have been
retroactive at all.
28 1
In the pending Enterprise Leasing litigation, the Arizona Court
of Appeals applied Carlton's modesty doctrine and concluded that
a six-year period of retroactivity passed constitutional muster.
28 2
Although the court determined it was not bound by Justice
278. Although tax legislation is not a promise and does not necessarily create vested
rights (see, e.g., Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33), it is difficult to argue that tax measures that im-
pose greater liability to prior acts and transactions do not impose new duties or obligations
with respect to past transactions. One potential exception is income tax provisions made
retroactive to the same calendar year, prior to filing of the return, provided that the tax-
payer did not take any action in reliance on the former state of the law.
279. See supra Part III(C).
280. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
326 Vol. 47
Retroactive Tax Legislation
O'Connor's one-year analysis, in sustaining the legislation, the
court relied on the fact that the Legislature did not become aware
of the potential application of the tax credits to motor vehicles un-
til approximately six months before the enactment of the subject
legislation.2
83
Although the post-Carlton decisions do not unanimously provide
that tax legislation with retroactive periods exceeding a year are
presumptively invalid, the decisions addressing the constitutional-
ity of retroactive tax statutes generally line up on either side of
the one-year threshold.284 Further, Rivers, City of Modesto, and
Johnson Controls each contain a more robust analysis of the mod-
esty doctrine and are the better reasoned authorities, providing a
sound legal and policy basis for a presumptive one-year standard.
In general, retroactive legislation undermines the ability of in-
dividuals and companies to act in their own interests, to avoid act-
ing in ways that will harm them, and to plan their conduct "with
reasonable certainty of the legal consequences." 28 5  Retroactive
legislation therefore has always been considered unfair.286 Retro-
active tax legislation is no different. By their nature, retroactive
tax measures are considered unjust, as they defeat taxpayers' rea-
sonable reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the action
in question. Thus, they should be limited and used sparingly.
While the retroactive application of particular tax measures may
advance the common good and rectify a previously made error in
legislation, tax jurisdictions should be required to act promptly or
face the prospect that the retroactivity passes the point that most
reasonable people "would think tolerable."
287
Moreover, notions of fundamental fairness and fair dealing war-
rant the adoption of a rebuttable presumption that tax legislation
with a retroactivity period greater than the year preceding the
legislation is unconstitutional. In the vast majority of cases up-
283. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text. The fact that the department had
not received a refund claim until such date does not establish that the Legislature had no
reason to know of the issue before the claim was filed.
284. As do the majority of cases decided before Carlton. See supra Parts III(A)-(C), cf.
Canisius Coll. v. U.S., 799 F.2d 18, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding law retroactively vali-
dating FICA taxes contributed four years earlier, based on lack of taxpayer reliance and
vested interests); Licari v. Comm'r of Revenue, 946 F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding
four-year period of retroactivity of enhanced penalties to under-reporting, in part, because
penalties already existed at time for intentional under-reporting).
285. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960).
286. Id.; Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936).
287. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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holding retroactive tax legislation, the legislative body enacted the
legislation at the first session following the period in question. In
Welch, for instance, although the period of retroactivity was be-
tween one and two years, the Supreme Court upheld the legisla-
tion because the Wisconsin State Legislature met every other year
and enacted the legislation at the legislative session immediately
following the tax year in question.
288
As Justice O'Connor observed in 1994 and Judge Learned Hand
noted in 1930, at some point, taxpayers should achieve finality
and be assured that the tax consequences of prior transactions
will not change to their detriment. Moreover, retroactive legisla-
tion must serve both a legitimate purpose and be reasonably re-
lated to its ends. With a presumptive one-year period of retroac-
tivity, legislative bodies have the ability to retroactively correct
mistakes and close loopholes, provided that they act promptly.
Presumptively invalidating tax legislation with longer periods of
retroactivity helps to ensure that legislative bodies will not unduly
delay retroactive amendments to the detriment of taxpayers.
Tax jurisdictions should be permitted the opportunity to sur-
mount the rebuttable presumption, however. The presumption
emanates from Carlton's second prong of the due process test-
whether the legislation was supported by rational means.28 9 As
articulated by Justice O'Connor and the three post-Carlton state
courts that have struck retroactive tax legislation, such legislation
is supported by rational means if it contains a relatively modest
period of retroactivity. In City of Modesto, the California Court of
Appeal observed that the legislative body must act promptly for a
retroactive tax measure to be supported by rational means. 290
The presumptive one-year look-back period is an attempt to
draw the line in a reasonable location. Of course, what is reason-
able depends on the circumstances, and government entities must
be afforded the ability to demonstrate that a retroactive tax meas-
ure's extension beyond the year preceding the legislation's enact-
ment is reasonable. The desire to stem revenue loss or to solve a
budget crisis is not sufficient, as such goals are embedded in Carl-
ton's first prong of whether the retroactive tax legislation was en-
acted for a legitimate purpose. To overcome the one-year pre-
sumption, the government should be required to show that it could
not have acted sooner.
288. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
289. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32.
290. City of Modesto, 128 Cal. App. 4th at 529.
328 Vol. 47
Retroactive Tax Legislation
Furthermore, the government should not be permitted to sur-
mount the presumption by enacting retroactive legislation within
a year of an adverse appellate decision. Legislative bodies have
either actual or constructive notice when taxpayers commence
litigation to challenge a tax measure. If the legislative branch
believes that the taxpayers may succeed and open the doors to
refund claims for other taxpayers, it should act promptly to rectify
any perceived defects in the legislation, rather than await the re-
sult of the litigation and then attempt to retroactively slam the
door on taxpayer refund claims.291 In short, if a legislature enacts
tax legislation that proves to be unconstitutional or otherwise in-
valid, it should not be permitted to await the result and retroac-
tively cure the defect without providing a remedy to aggrieved
taxpayers. On the other hand, if a legislative body can demon-
strate that it had no objective reason to be aware of a legal infir-
mity in tax legislation and that it was unable to have acted
sooner,292 it should be permitted to overcome the presumption of
unconstitutionality if the tax law's period of retroactivity exceeds
one year.
V. CALIFORNIA TAX AMNESTY ACT
In 2004, California enacted a tax amnesty program that offered
individual and corporate taxpayers amnesty from penalties and
criminal action for certain underpaid sales, use, income, and fran-
chise tax liabilities.293 The amnesty program ran from February 1,
2005, through March 31, 2005, and permitted taxpayers to seek
291. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
292. For instance, in the Enterprise Leasing litigation, to surmount the presumption of
unconstitutionality created by the six-year period of retroactivity, the state could assert
that it had no reason to be aware of the motor vehicle loophole in the existing tax credit
legislation until the first such credit was claimed in December 1999, only months before the
enactment of the amending legislation. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. In
response, the taxpayer could assert that the text of the original legislation reasonably per-
mitted application of the credit to personal property attached to motor vehicles, and there-
fore, the legislature should have been aware of the issue. The parties could present evi-
dence at trial regarding the issue of whether the Legislature could have acted sooner.
293. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7072 & 19732 (2004). The amnesty program was created
by SB 1100, and signed into law on August 16, 2004. The amnesty portion of the legislation
permitted taxpayers to avoid penalties and any criminal prosecution by paying all past due
taxes, plus interest. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 7072(a). The benefits of the amnesty pro-
gram were available to all taxpayers with tax liabilities that resulted from the non-filing of
returns, underreported income on filed returns, claimed excessive deductions, or any un-
paid tax liabilities from previously determined amounts. Id. at § 7073(a)-(b). The benefits
were not available to taxpayers who were under, or had been given notice that they were




amnesty for any taxable year through and including 2002.294 Any
payment made under the amnesty program was purportedly non-
refundable.
295
In addition to offering the carrot of penalty waiver and relief
from criminal prosecution, the amnesty program wielded a big
stick. Unlike most tax amnesty programs, the California amnesty
legislation created and applied a significant new penalty to certain
taxpayers who did not participate in the amnesty program, includ-
ing taxpayers who did not become aware of liabilities until after
the amnesty period ended. This penalty is imposed on amounts
that were "due and payable" on the last day of the amnesty period,
as well as on amounts that become "due and payable" after March
31, 2005.296 The penalty amount is equal to 50% of the interest on
tax deficiencies, calculated on the interest due from the original
due date of the return to March 31, 2005.297 Additionally, for sales
and use taxes, taxpayers who were eligible for the amnesty pro-
gram but did not participate were subject to penalties at double
the normal rate.298 The legislation also provided the State Board
of Equalization ("SBOE") with an extended statute of limitations
of 10 years to make a deficiency determination. 299 For franchise
tax purposes, the legislation retroactively increased the accuracy
related penalty for "substantial understatement of income tax"
from 20% to 40%.300 As the open audit period on corporate tax-
payers often extends many years, a penalty tied to interest
amounts could exceed the actual tax liability for the years in ques-
tion.
To make the penalties even more draconian, the Franchise Tax
Board ("FTB") has interpreted this penalty to apply to every in-
come and franchise tax deficiency for taxable years prior to 2003
and existing on March 31, 2005, regardless of whether the defi-
ciency was known (or should have been known) during the am-
294. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7071 & 19731 (2009).
295. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7074(d) & 19777.5(c) (2009).
296. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7074(a) & 19777.5(a). The issue of when a tax amount is
"due and payable" is currently being litigated in River Garden Ret. Home v. Franchise Tax
Bd., No. A123316 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., Div. 4, filed November 6, 2008).
297. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7074(a) & 19777.5(a) (2009). The amount of the penalty
is calculated on the interest due from the original due date of the return to March 31, 2005.
298. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 7073(c) (2009). This provision resulted in non-fraud re-
lated penalties being increased to 20% of the tax owed.
299. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 7073(d) (2009). The regular statute of limitations for the
SBOE to make sales and use tax assessments is three years. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6487
(2009).
300. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 19164(a)(1) (2009).
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nesty period. 301 This interpretation has the effect of imposing ret-
roactive strict liability on taxpayers. Even if a taxpayer were un-
aware of a prior-year tax deficiency during the two-month am-
nesty program, if the taxpayer elected not to participate in the
program, the legislation sought to retroactively apply a penalty to
the tax deficiency in an amount potentially greater than the un-
derlying tax liability.
Moreover, the amnesty program purports to prohibit taxpayers
from challenging any amnesty penalty assessments on franchise
taxes, whether through a protest after assessment or through a
refund claim after payment. 30 2 This absence of remedy and the
terms of the program have placed taxpayers in a precarious posi-
tion. Many alleged tax deficiencies and assessments are the result
of a good-faith disagreement between the tax jurisdiction and the
taxpayer. For taxpayers who believed that they might have a po-
tential liability for tax years beginning before 2003 (even if they
believed in good faith that they did not), the amnesty program es-
sentially asked them to concede the tax, waive all rights to a re-
fund, and pay the tax or be subject to a severe penalty for the
years in question. Even worse, taxpayers who were unaware of a
potential liability for tax years beginning before 2003 were also
subject to application of the penalty for the older years.
Faced with the choice of harsh retroactive penalties or the
waiver of appeal and refund rights, many taxpayers made protec-
tive payments to the FTB outside the amnesty program, both to
avoid penalties and to ensure the legal ability to pursue a refund
of the payments if it was later determined that the tax, or any por-
tion of it, was in fact not due. These protective payments greatly
exceeded the amnesty program revenue. While the amnesty pro-
gram collected $550 million in revenue, taxpayers paid $3.555 bil-
lion in protective payments. 30 3 Because these payments were of-
ten made on legitimately disputed items, the state will be required
to return many of the protective payments, with interest.
30 4
301. See River Garden, No. A123316; see also Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, California's
Amnesty Program - A 'Gift' Taxpayers Would Prefer Not to Receive, STATE TAX NOTES, July
24, 2006, at 257, p. /16/. The FTB interpreted the statutory language "each taxable year for
which amnesty could have been requested" to mean any and all years beginning before
January 1, 2003. Id. at /4/.
302. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 19777.5(d) and (e) (2009).
303. Lenny Goldberg, Amnesty Discussions at FTB Generate New Data, STATE TAX
NOTES, July 18, 2005 at 193. The $3.5 billion in protective payments was generated from




The absence of a statutory remedy for recovery of the amnesty
penalty plainly violates procedural due process. California's am-
nesty legislation purports to deprive taxpayers of a pre-
deprivation remedy (ability to challenge an assessment) and a
post-deprivation remedy (ability to pay and maintain a refund
claim). The failure of the state to provide either form of remedy is
a patent violation of procedural due process.30 5
More critically for purposes of this article, the legislation vio-
lates substantive due process based on the analysis in Part IV.
The legislation imposes the amnesty penalty, as of March 31,
2005, on taxpayers that owed a tax for any year beginning before
January 1, 2003.306 Particularly for a large corporate taxpayer,
whose open tax periods may exceed the standard four-year statute
of limitations, the amnesty penalty may increase tax-related li-
abilities for many years.30 7 During these years, the amnesty pro-
gram and concomitant penalty did not exist. In seeking to signifi-
cantly increase taxpayer liability for these past periods, the am-
nesty legislation constitutes a retroactive tax measure subject to
scrutiny under substantive due process.
In attempting to impose an enhanced penalty on tax years be-
fore 2003, the 2004 amnesty legislation seeks to impose a tax-
related liability with a period of retroactivity in excess of the year
prior to the year the legislation was enacted (2004). Under the
test advocated in Part IV, supra, the period of retroactivity is ex-
cessive, and the legislation presumptively violates substantive due
process. Indeed, the amnesty legislation's period of retroactivity is
similar in length to, and in certain circumstances may even ex-
ceed, the period of retroactivity that prompted the courts in City of
Modesto (up to eight years in length) and Johnson Controls (up to
nine years) to declare the legislation unconstitutional. Moreover,
the retroactivity period of the amnesty legislation will in almost
every instance exceed the two- to three-year retroactivity period
305. In the seminal tax remedies case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states must
afford taxpayers with a clear and certain remedy-either pre-deprivation or post-
deprivation, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McKesson Corp.
v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36 (1990).
306. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 19777.5. Several taxpayers have challenged the constitu-
tionality of the amnesty legislation. For instance, in River Garden, No. A123316, among
other arguments, the taxpayer has alleged that the amnesty legislation violated both pro-
cedural and substantive due process.
307. Generally, the statute of limitations for franchise tax assessments is four years
from the date the return was filed. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 19057(a) (2004). In River
Garden, the amnesty penalty could apply to tax years 1999-2000, resulting in a seven-year
period of retroactivity. River Garden, No. A123316.
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found excessive by the Rivers Court. California taxpayers who
filed their initial sales, use, income, and franchise tax returns
years ago in good faith308 should not be burdened with onerous
tax-related obligations that did not exist at the time they filed
their returns.
The retroactive application of the amnesty-related penalty is
therefore presumptively unconstitutional. Moreover, several ex-
acerbating factors make it unlikely that the state could overcome
the presumption. First, unlike the federal legislation upheld in
Carlton, the tax-amnesty legislation did not seek to close a loop-
hole or correct a drafting error made in prior legislation. Rather,
it sought to raise revenue in 2005 by imposing severe penalties on
taxpayers who underreported sales, use, income, or franchise tax
liability for tax years prior to 2003.
Second, the legislation seeks to apply an increased tax penalty.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that legislation
which retroactively imposes a tax penalty warrants stricter scru-
tiny than legislation retroactively increasing tax liability.30 9 Ap-
plication of a more searching substantive due process standard to
the amnesty legislation enhances the likelihood that it will be
struck as unconstitutional.
Third, California courts have already consistently applied a one-
year standard to retroactive tax legislation. City of Modesto ob-
served that, in general, California courts have upheld the retroac-
tive application of tax laws only where the retroactivity was lim-
ited to the current tax year.310 Coupled with the nature of the ret-
roactive tax penalty and its potentially long retroactive reach, it is
likely a California appellate court will invalidate the amnesty
penalty if challenged under substantive due process.
The FTB and several commentators have expressed the opinion
that the amnesty legislation may not be unconstitutional because
taxpayers had the opportunity during the amnesty period to cor-
rect past reporting mistakes and therefore avoid the amnesty pen-
alty, either through payment under the amnesty program or by
making a protective payment outside the amnesty program but
within the two-month window.311 Under this view, the amnesty
308. Without the amnesty legislation, California taxpayers who are found to have pre-
pared fraudulent returns lose protection of the statute of limitations and are subject to
penalties equal to 75% of the liability. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 19164(c) & 19087 (2009).
309. Licari, 946 F.2d at 695.
310. 128 Cal. App. 4th at 529 (citing Gutknecht, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 282).
311. See, e.g., Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, California's Amnesty Program - A 'Gift'
Taxpayers Would Prefer Not to Receive STATE TAX NOTES, July 24, 2006 at 257.
Spring 2009
Duquesne Law Review
legislation may not be retroactive at all, or if so, retroactive for
only a modest period.
This characterization of the amnesty program and penalty fails
for at least two critical reasons. First, in denying taxpayers any
ability to obtain a refund of tax overpaid to the FTB under the
auspices of the amnesty program, the amnesty program does not
really afford taxpayers a meaningful choice to avoid retroactive
penalties. A taxpayer with a legitimate filing position will under-
standably be reluctant to concede the tax and delinquent interest
at issue and waive any right to litigate the validity of its position.
The legal ability to avoid the imposition of the retroactive penalty
is therefore a hollow option to those taxpayers possessing a good-
faith justification for their filing positions.
Second, the ability of taxpayers to file protective payments out-
side the amnesty program-therefore retaining the legal ability to
seek a refund of overpaid tax while avoiding the nonpayment pen-
alty-does not sufficiently eliminate the harsh and unreasonable
nature of the amnesty legislation. The penalty applies to all tax-
payers found to have underpaid their income or franchise taxes
prior to 2003, even those who had no idea that a potential delin-
quency existed at the end of the amnesty window. These taxpay-
ers obviously had no reason to make a protective payment during
the two-month amnesty period and, therefore, lacked the ability to
avoid imposition of the penalty to past reporting periods.
Moreover, even those taxpayers who believe that they will have
some potential underpayment liability for prior years will, in gen-
eral, be uncertain as to the amount of tax liability at issue. It is
the rare case when corporate taxpayers can isolate a particular
issue and calculate the potential liability with precision. Often-
times, there are competing issues within a given return, with
some issues potentially offering the ability to offset a deficiency in
another area. Accordingly, while a protective payment could par-
tially eliminate the application of the penalty, the penalty will still
be imposed retroactively on the assessed balance. Although tax-
payers theoretically could grossly overpay the potential liability to
insure against the penalty, such a payment would (1) deprive the
taxpayer of the use of the funds during the audit and appeal,
which often lasts years; (2) create a host of accounting-related is-
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sues; and (3) potentially subject the taxpayer to greater tax liabil-
ity than it actually had.312
CONCLUSION
Tax legislation that contains a retroactive period greater than
one year, such as California's Tax Amnesty Act, passes the point
that most reasonable people would consider tolerable. The period
of retroactivity is not narrowly tailored to accommodate the com-
peting interests of the state and taxpayers, the latter of whom, at
some point, should be free to move on without threat of enhanced
tax or penalty consequences for prior transactions. While rigid
application of a one-year period is mechanical and overly simplis-
tic, a presumptive one-year period is consistent with judicial
precedent, and further, the presumption draws a reasonable line
that enhances certainty for tax jurisdictions and taxpayers alike.
312. The old adage that possession is nine-tenths of the law often appropriately de-
scribes the difficulty in obtaining a recovery of overpaid taxes.
Spring 2009 335

